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ARGUMENT
I.

THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE PARTIES' CONTRACT
BECAUSE THE PROPERTY WAS AND IS UNMARKETABLE DUE TO LACK OF
LEGAL ACCESS.
The Jacksons take the position throughout their brief that

there was legal access to the north lane during at least some of
the time relevant to this action; making the property marketable
and the Mostrongs7 action for rescission unjustified.

Nothing

could be farther from the true state of the record.
It is undisputed, when the Jacksons entered into the trust
deed with the Mostrongs on September 1, 1987 and, two years later,
on September 1, 1989, when the trust deed became due, that the
Jacksons had not provided any legal, recorded means of access to
the property.

It is equally undisputed that, in January of 1990,

Security Title Co. caused Geraldine Kessler, the original grantor
of the property, to execute deeds purporting to grant an easement
in the north lane to the Mostrongs. The language in this deed and
the preceeding deeds is also undisputed.
. As the basis for their claim that an easement was actually
conveyed, the Jacksons rely upon the following language in each
original deed:

"TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO a 33 foot easement

over and across the East 33 feet of said property for road and
utility purposes."

(Appellee's Brief p. 6)

Wayne M. Pinder, an

expert witness, however, gave uncontroverted testimony that Ms.
Kessler's deeds actually conveyed no easement interest to the
Mostrongs because the language relied upon by the Jacksons only
conveyed an easement to each purchaser over the east 33 feet of his
own property for road purposes, but did not reserve any rights in
the road in Geraldine Kessler, herself. (T. 347-48, In 21-14; T.

351, In 2-5)

Without such a reservation, Geraldine Kessler had no

rights in the road to convey to anyone, including the Mostrongs.
These deeds, accordingly were only an illusory solution to the
problem; they did not succeed in conveying a legal right of access
to the Mostrongs.
The Jacksons rely upon Burton v. United States, 29 Utah 2d
226, 507 P.2d 710 (Utah 1973), to suggest that the quoted language
of the deed created a reservation of rights in Ms. Kessler.
Burton, however, does not support the Jacksons' point:
An exception excludes from the grant the property or
estate therein described. If a conveyance contains a
reservation, the entire property or estate described
passes to the grantee subject to the right, estate, or
easement reserved. The reservation creates a new right
issuing out of the property granted, which did not exist
as an independent right before the grant.
Id. at 712. There is no language in the relevant documents which
explicitly

create a reservation

in Geraldine Kessler

easement to the road in question.

for an

The quoted language does not

create an exception either; it creates only a road easement to the
eas/t 33 feet of the particular parcel of property and nothing else.
The Jacksons further rely upon Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 81
Utah 355, 18 P.2d 292 (Utah 1933), to support their argument that
the

Kessler

deeds

should

be

interpreted

according

to

the

"circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the
parties, the state of the thing granted, and the object to be
attained." Id. at 294. (Appellee's Brief p. 29) Stevens refers to
inapplicable

facts and

irrelevant

interpreting the Kessler deeds.

law, so

is not useful

in

The factual setting of Stevens

concerned the extent and purpose of an indisputably existing
2

easement, as opposed to the present attempt to create an easement
about which the relevant documents are silent.
with the legal principle of parol evidence.

Stevens also deals
Although parol

evidence is relevant to interpret ambiguous contractual language,
it is not admissible where there is no ambiguity on the face of the
document.

See Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P.2d 976,

977-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
an easement

Where there is no language reserving

in the present deeds, there

is no ambiguity to

interpret and Stevens is of no assistance.
The Jacksons allege that no one ever contested the right of
the Jacksons or the Mostrongs to use the north lane for access to
the property, and raise the related argument that the Mostrongs had
an easement by implication to the road.

In support of these

arguments, the Jacksons refer to the testimony of the manager of
Security Title, who "felt there was an implied easement due to the
work he had done on the property and the intention that there was
an implied easement to the north."

(Appellee's Brief p. 10).

Whi,le such facts would be useful evidence in establishing the
existence of an access easement in an appropriate legal action,
they, in and of themselves, do not create a legal, recorded
easement. Such facts do not eliminate the necessity of bringing an
action to obtain the legal, recorded access easement to which the
Mostrongs were entitled, and which Lee Roy Jackson led Larry
Mostrong to believe existed.
There is no dispute that the Jacksons obtained title insurance
through Security Title, and that Security Title procured the
Kessler deeds.

The Jacksons go to great lengths to argue that
3

legal access was provided by means of this title insurance because
the insurance specifically insured against unmarketability of title
and because the Earnest Money Agreement stated that the Jacksons
were to furnish good and marketable title "evidenced by a current
policy of title insurance."
First,
insurable

as pointed

title

is not

out

(Appellant's Brief p. 20)
in detail

necessarily

in appellant's brief,

marketable

title, and a

purchaser of real property is entitled to rescind a contract if the
title is unmarketable even if insurable.

Brown v. Yacht Club of

Coer D'Alene, Ltd, 111 Idaho 195, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1986).
Although a title insurance policy shows that the property is
insurable, which is evidence probative of the conclusion that the
property is probably marketable, the policy does not, in and of
itself, make the property marketable. Title insurance is designed
to indemnify a property holder should he or she become involved in
litigation respecting the marketability of his title, but does not
guarantee that there will be no such litigation.

See Valley Bank

& Trust Co. v. U. S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933,
935-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

A purchaser of real property is not

obliged to purchase a potential lawsuit. Brown, 722 P.2d at 1065.
Notably, the Earnest Money Agreement did not provide that a policy
of title insurance could be provided in lieu of conveying good and
marketable title.
The Jacksons7 reliance upon Holmby. Inc. v. Pino, 647 P.2d 392
(Nev. 1982) , to show that a purchaser was not justified in
rescinding a contract because he was fully protected by a policy of
title insurance, (Appellee's Brief p. 22), is not justified here.
4

The factual situation in Holmby is distinguishable as follows:
There was an unsatisfied trust deed encumbering the property at the
time the buyer was to tender his down payment into an escrow
account.

There would have been, however, sufficient funds in the

escrow account to pay off the trust deed, as well as a policy of
title insurance, so there was no evidence that the seller would not
have been able to deliver marketable title.
buyers rescission was not justified.

Accordingly, the

In contrast, even though

there was a policy of title insurance available in the present
situation, the Mostrongs never did receive a legal, deeded access
easement to the property and the title continued, during all
relevant times, to be unmarketable. Furtehr, there is no policy of
title insurance in effect on the defective Kessler deeds.

(A. 13,

In 16-21_)
Accordingly, the Jacksons' conclusion that "it

[Security

Title] effectively cured any question regarding the *recorded
easement' requested by FHA,11 (Appellee's Brief p. 29) not only begs
the. question but is false. In short, the Jacksons never delivered
legal access to the property to the Mostrongs, in blatant breach of
their covenant to convey marketable title.

The Mostrongs should,

accordingly, be entitled to rescind the contract.
II.

THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT BECAUSE THE
JACKSONS DELIVERED UNPINANCEABLE PROPERTY TO THEM.
As discussed at length in the Mostrongs' main brief, the

Jacksons failed to deliver financeable property

in two ways:

First, the property not only did not have a legal, deeded access,
but did not have access by means of a dedicated county road within

5

three hundred feet of the house; and second, the construction of
the house was substandard.

These reasons for denial are well

attested by the loan application records,

(T.220, Ex. 2S; T. 39,

41, Ex. 7; T. 52, Ap. 41-42, Ex. 17)
A.

The Preponderance of the Evidence Indicates That The
Property Was Unfinanceable Because Of Lack Of Approved
Access.

The Jacksons make the incredible argument that the property
was not denied financing because of "lack of access."

(Appellee's

brief p. 24) This is simply not true. Kent Dalton, the manager of
Security Title, testified that he had a telephone conversation with
Linda Whiteman in which he learned that the appraiser had rejected
the property "because of lack of recorded access."
13; A. 22, In 16-19)

(A. 10, In 7-

It is patently obvious from the record that

the property was rejected for financing by First Security Bank
because it was not located within three hundred feet of a publicly
maintained road.

This is clearly a problem for which "lack of

access" was the term used throughout the trial.
The Jacksons attempt to evade the access issue by asserting
that Judy Hardinger of Valley Central Bank did not seem to think
that access was an issue.

(Appellee,s Brief p. 24) The Jacksons'

assertion is misleading because the access issue had, at least
initially, been resolved at the time Judy Hardinger considered the
property because she was aware of the Millard County Commission's
letter indicating that the county was willing to accept the
Tuckfield road.

(A. 42-43, In 25-11)

Further, Joseph Stott's

testimony indicates that the access was, indeed, a concern for
Valley Central Bank.

He testified that he imposed a requirement,
6

namely, that "documentation needs to be provided showing that the
subject has access by a county road or deeded easement,"

(T. 119,

In. 19-21), because of this concern.
The Jacksons make the remarkable claim that the Mostrongs'
obtaining an easement over the south road was inconsistent with
their position that the south road was the bargained-for access.
(Appellee's Brief p. 34)

First, this claim makes no sense on its

face. Second, it is indisputable that the south road was the major
access in that:

(1) It was the shortest distance to a county road,

being three times shorter than the north lane; (2) it was improved
while the north lane was nothing but a poorly maintained, rutted,
dirt lane; and (3) it was the primary means of access used by all,
including the Jacksons. In fact, the Jacksons were responsible for
creating and improving the south road in the first place.
In 14-23)

(T. 237,

If the north lane was the primary means of access, the

Jacksons presumably would have improved the north road instead.
Third, because of the above factors, the south road was the only
access that was a reasonable candidate for county dedication; it
would have been prohibitively expensive to improve the north lane
to the point where it would qualify for county dedication.

When

the Mostrongs discovered there was no easement to the south road,
the busied themselved in obtaining one.

If this was not the major

access to the property, it is inconceivable that they would have
spent time and money to obtain this easement.

Their behavior,

contrary to the Jacksons' assertion, was entirely consistent with
their belief that the south road was the bargained-for access.

7

As to the Jacksons' assertion that the Mostrongs "voluntarily"
obtained the easement to the south road, (Appellee's Brief p. 32),
the Mostrongs took what effort they could to obtain a qualifying
access because the Jacksons were apparently unwilling to do so, as
shown by their letter refusing to be liable for any expenses of
obtaining an access easement or improving it.

(T. 43, Ex. 15)

The Jacksons assert that the Mostrongs obtained the Tuckfield
easement "at no cost to themselves," (Appellee's Brief p. 32),
apparently in an attempt to show that there was really not an
access problem.

This assertion is not true.

First, there is no

evidence on the record as to whether Ralph Tuckfield charged the
Mostrongs for the easement. Even if he did not, however, obtaining
the easement was not without cost to the Mostrongs. The Mostrongs
hired attorney Brent Bullock to obtain this easement. Mr. Bullock
charged the Mostrongs for his services.

Even had the Mostrongs

obtained the easement at no cost, however, the Jacksons' duty to
provide both legal and financeable access to the property is not
diminished.
The Jacksons claim that Millard County accepted the south road
unconditionally, and that no improvements were required.

Whether

Millard County was going to require the Mostrongs to bring the
south road up to county specifications is equivocal on the record.
According to the county attorney, who physically held the Tuckfield
deed pending the upgrading of the road to county standards,
upgrading was required, although the County Commission letter
tentatively

agreeing

to

accept

conditions.

(T. 248-50) It is clear, however, that the dedication
8

the

road

did

not

state

any

was never formally completed.

Regardless of whether a requirement

to upgrade was or would have ultimately been imposed
important;

what

is

important

is

that,

from

the

is not

Mostrongs'

perspective in the spring of 1990, such a requirement could be
imposed, and it might be expensive.

That the Mostrongs and, in

fact, the Jacksons, had such a concern is unequivocally illustrated
by the record:

Jennifer Mostrong testified that, because of this

concern, she contacted the county about road specifications and
then requested a bid for upgrading the road from Reed Penney, (T.
56-57), who obtained specifications from the county.
9-12).

(T. 204, In.

The Jacksons pointed out that Lee Roper, the county

official in charge of road maintenance, did not remember this
conversation with Jennifer Mostrong.

This testimony

is not

dispositive of the issue, but may show only that Ms. Mostrong spoke
with someone else or that Mr. Roper did not remember a brief
conversation that had occurred over two years before. Finally, the
Jacksons*

concern, as set forth in their

letter, that

" [w]e

(Ja.ckson'rs) [sic] will not be liable for any cost of the Mostrong's
[sic] obtaining . . . upgrading of road," belies their argument
that the parties believed that no upgrading was or ever could be
required.
Because the two major briefs have set forth in detail the
evidence supporting the trial courts finding that the county did
not require the road to be upgraded, it is not necessary to
reiterate it here.

This evidence does not, however, negate the

very real concern that the parties had in the spring of 1990 that
such a requirement might be imposed.
9

Had the Mostrongs reasonably

believed that they might be responsible for bringing the road up to
county standards, which reasonable belief the record supports, they
could also reasonably feel that this was more of an expense than
they had bargained for in purchasing the property and, accordingly,
be justified in rescinding the contract.
The Jacksons point out that Reed Penney did not inspect the
road prior to entering his bid.

(Appellee's Brief p. 33 n. 5)

What the Jacksons failed to point out was that Reed Penney was
intimately familiar with the condition of the road because the
Jacksons had hired him to do the initial grading and improvements
only a few years before.

(T. 2 37)

In summary, despite their misleading and erroneous factual
assertions, the Jacksons have failed to demonstrate that the
preponderance of the evidence does not indicate that the property
was not financeable because of problems with access.
B.

The Preponderance Of The Evidence Shows That The Property
Was
Unfinanceable
Because
Of
Substandard
House
Construction.

The second reason that financing was not available was because
of the substandard construction of the house.
The Jacksons make the outrageous and totally unsupportable
assertion that "nowhere in the record is it established that the
Mostrongs were denied financing because of the home construction."
It is obvious from the record that the reason Valley Central Bank
denied financing on the house was because of the construction of
the house.

(A. p. 41, In. 2-18; T. 52; Ex. 17)

It is equally

unreasonable for the Jacksons to assert that the UBC standards are
irrelevant; Joseph Stott, appraiser
10

for Valley

Central Bank,

testified that the primary construction standard used by both FHA
and conventional underwriters, including himself, is the UBC. (T.
120-121, In. 17-5).
The Jacksons argue that the house construction was not
deficient because the Mostrongs lived in the house for over two
years without complaining about it.

(Appellee's Brief pp. 47-48)

What the Jacksons do not point out is that the construction of the
house only became an issue in June of 1990, when the house was
turned down for financing because of these defects.

Experience

should indicate that a house may be habitable but not up to code.
To summarize, the Jacksons failed to deliver property which
was reasonably financeable. That the court concluded otherwise, in
the face of almost overwhelming evidence to the contrary, is not
evidence that the Jacksons delivered financeable property.

The

record indicates that the parties believed that the property would
be financeable and that the only obstacle to financing was the
necessity that the Mostrongs establish a two-year income history in
Utah. This is a reasonable precondition and assumption underlying
the parties' contract.

When the Jacksons failed and refused to

deliver such property, they breached their contractual obligations.
The Mostrongs, therefore, should be entitled

to rescind the

contract.
III. FINANCING WAS NOT REASONABLY AVAILABLE TO THE MOSTRONGS.
The Jacksons rely upon the trial court7s finding No. 13 as
evidence that financing was reasonably available to the Mostrongs.
Because the trial court's findings are precisely what are at issue

11

here, such reliance

is totally

improper.

Further there is

inadequate factual basis for the trial court's finding.
The

trial

court

apparently

relies

upon

the

alleged

representation of the Zions Bank loan officer to the Mostrongs that
Zions would be "willing to loan the Mostrongs money to purchase the
property after they established a stable income over a two-year
period."

(Appellee's Brief pp. 8-9 f 13)

This alleged statement

does not, however, indicate that financing was reasonably available
on the property.
At the time this representation was allegedly made, the
Mostrongs had not yet qualified for a loan and could not have
qualified

for a loan because they had not met the two-year

residency requirement.

The statement was not set forth on a

contractual basis, and no consideration was given for it.
reality

The

is that this representation was in the nature of a

condolence by the loan officer —

"I am sorry that you did not

qualify for a loan this time, but come back and try again in two
yea,rs."

It was not a guarantee and did not mean that Zions would

unequivocally and unconditionally offer financing at a later date.
Had the Mostrongs reapplied at Zions, they would have applied
for an FHA loan. The property had been rejected for FHA financing
when the Mostrongs applied through First Security Bank.

Linda

Whiteman, the First Security Loan Officer, testified that she felt
they "had exhausted all possibilities of approving an FHA insured
mortgage."

(A. 33, In 8-9) Because the underwriter's requirements

will not vary regardless of the financial institution applied

12

through, the property would have also been rejected by the FHA had
the Mostrongs applied through Zions' Bank.
The trial court and the Jacksons rely upon the fact that the
Mostrongs did not apply for financing between September 1, 1987 and
September 1, 1989 to support their conclusion that the Mostrongs
did not diligently attempt to obtain financing.

They not only

ignore the fact that the Mostrongs inquired as to the possibility
of obtaining financing in August of 1988, but conveniently overlook
the fact that the reason for the two-year trust deed was to allow
the Mostrongs to establish a two-year income history in Utah as a
prerequisite for obtaining financing, which period was to begin on
September 1, 1987 and end on September 1, 1889.
The trial court's and the Jacksons7 apparent reliance upon the
inference that the problems with the property were ultimately
resolved as of June 1990, making financing easily available,
distorts the record.

They rely upon the facts that the Mostrongs

had obtained a letter of acceptance from Millard County and had the
Tuckfield deed for the south road, and that the Jacksons had
offered to pay the cost of repairs on the house.

The record,

however, shows that the problems were not, in fact, resolved as of
June 1990.
Although the problem of the south road easement and acceptance
appeared to be substantially resolved as of June 1990, there was a
substantial probability, as discussed in detail above, that the
road dedication could cost the Mostrongs several thousand dollars,
if dedication was made conditional upon bringing the road up to
county standards. The issue, therefore, was not resolved as far as
13

the Mostrongs were concerned.

Further, Joseph Stott's testimony,

in which he stated that he required some proof of dedication or
easement before financing could be offered, indicates that the
issue was not fully resolved, in view of the fact that the
dedication was not complete at that time.
It is undisputed that the Jacksons apparently wrote a letter
offering to pay the expense of correcting some of the structural
defects of the house. Notably, there were more than three or four
defects according to Joseph Stott's testimony:
The only heat in the kitchen, living room and family room
are wood, are the wood stoves. One bath is not vented.
Hot water heater wired as needs to be placed in a
conduct, [sic] The supports underneath the home are wood
and on grade level. I could not determine if they are
set on a concrete footing because black vinyl had been
laid on the ground. The footings for the supports should
be stand up [sic] eight inches for termite protection.
(T. 119, In 9-16)

This letter was apparently never communicated to

the Mostrongs, so the Mostrongs did not respond to it.

For the

issue to have been resolved, however, the Jacksons would have had
to have actually performed the repairs by June of 1990 for the
house to qualify for financing.
Financing may have been more available to the Mostrongs had
the Jacksons not been so anxious to foreclose on the property. The
Jacksons noticed up no less than three trustee's sales between
March and June of 1990, during which time the Mostrongs were
attempting to resolve the problems with the property created by the
Jacksons and apply for financing.

Although these sales were

continued by the Jacksons at the insistence of Mr. Bullock, the
Mostrongs could not have felt, in June of 1990, even if the

14

problems with the property had been resolved, that there was
sufficient time to apply again for financing.
The Jacksons argue that the Mostrongs should have gone back to
First Security Bank, after obtaining the acceptance letter from the
Millard County Commission in June of 1990, because they would have
then qualified for the FHA loan. By June of 1990, the application
had lapsed and a new application and appraisal would have had to be
done. This would have cost the Mostrongs another $300 and taken at
least another month before an initial determination as to the
availability of financing could have been available.
In. 25-8; A. 48, In. 5-8)

(A. 28-29,

The Mostrongs reasonably felt that they

did not have this much time.
The Jacksons argue that the Mostrongs did not qualify for
financing because of a collection action against them.

Not only

was there no trial court finding on this issue, but such an
argument directly contradicts the Jacksons' position that financing
was reasonably available to the Mostrongs.

Nevertheless, while

there were several questions as to Mostrongs' credit, including
several tax liens and a $39.00 collection action, none of these
were sufficient to prevent the Mostrongs from obtaining financing.
Judy Hardinger, the loan officer at Valley Central Bank who dealt
with these issues, testified that if the Mostrongs paid and
resolved these issues that would have resolved the problem, and
that there were a number of good items in their credit history.
(A. 43-44, In. 14-13)

Ms. Hardinger testified that the tax liens

were, in fact, cured. (A. 46, In. 22-25). In short, these were not
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substantial issues and would not have resulted in the denial of
financing absent the structural defects of the house.
The Jacksons raise the specious argument that the Mostrongs
could never have satisfied the two-year verification of income
requirement because Larry Mostrong worked in California for part of
the time.

Larry Mostrong had Utah as his official residence,

however, and paid income taxes in Utah.

The location of his work

was not relevant.
The Mostrongs had already expended substantial resources in
the attempt to correct the defects in the property and obtain
financing despite the defects. The Jacksons, simultaneously, were
making continual demands for additional money and constantly
noticing trustee's sales. Under such adverse circumstances, all of
which were created by the Jacksons, it is unreasonable for the
Jacksons to say, on the one hand, that the Mostrongs could have
gotten financing if they had only worked harder and spent more
money curing problems created by the Jacksons, and then argue that
they should not be entitled to rescind the contract because
financing was reasonably available.
IV.

THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT BACAUSE THE
JACKSONS
MADE
MATERIAL
FRAUDULENT
OR
NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATIONS REGARDING THE PROPERTY TO THEM.
The Jacksons assert that the Mostrongs did not marshal the

evidence supporting the trial courts findings relating to this
issue.

In fact, the Mostrongs did so in their principal brief,

albeit not as thoroughly as should have been done because of the
brief length limitation.

To resolve all doubts, however, a

reiteration of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings,
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following the elements set forth in Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787
P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (for elements, see Appellant's
Brief p. 37), follows:

The representations at issue were made to

the Mostrongs by Lee Roy Jackson, according to own testimony, and
dealt with three facts:

(1) The north lane, at the time of sale,

was the legal access to the property; (2) the south road, at the
time of sale, was a private lane which was permissively used; and
(3) the house, at the time of sale, was either FHA approvable or
approved.

The only evidence on the record which would indicate

that these representations were not false, at the time they were
made and at the time of sale are the facts relating to constructive
and adverse easements over both the north lane and the south road,
that there was no building code in effect at the time the house was
built,

and

Lee

Roy

Jackson's

testimony

that

he

made

no

representations regarding the construction of the house. The court
made no findings as to inducement, the Mostrongs' reasonable
reliance upon Lee Roy Jackson's representations, or the Mostrongs'
damages.

(The evidence relied upon and the citations to the record

supporting them are laid out in detail in both parties' major
briefs.)
The Mostrongs presented evidence sufficient to satisfy all of
the prongs of the Wright test, as is shown by the discussion in
Appellant's Brief on pp. 37-42.

Nevertheless, in response to the

Jacksons' query (Appellee's Brief p. 35), the following evidence
supports elements 2, 3, 7, and 8:
Elements
things,

in

(2) and

December,

(3) are shown as follows:
1990,

more
17

than

two

years

Among other
after

the

representations had been made, Jennifer Mostrong discovered that
there was no recorded access easement to the property, either to
the north or to the south, and that there never had been.
42)

(T. 41-

Lee Roy Jackson, himself, testifed that he knew he did not

have a recorded easement to the south road, knew the property had
been sold, and had not requested permission from the new owner to
use the road.

(T. 133-134) (Please refer to appellants Brief pp.

38-39 for full discussion.)
Elements (7) and (8) are shown by Larry Mostrong's testimony
that he sought information regarding the access issue from Lee Roy
Jackson and then relied upon the information provided, and the fact
that he purchased the property in the face of his testimony that he
would not have done so had he known that it was landlocked.
(Please see Appellant's Brief pp. 39-41)
The preponderance of the evidence favors the position of the
Mostrongs and works against the trial court's findings on many of
the elements of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.

The

only evidence on the record for several elements, however, are the
conflicting testimonies of the Mostrongs and Lee Roy Jackson. For
a finding to be proper, it must be based upon credible evidence.
For evidence to be credible, it must be clear and convincing.
Nordstrom v. Miller. 227 Kan. 59, 605 P.2d 545, 552 (1980) .
The term "clear and convincing evidence" means: [t]he
witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible; the
facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly
remembered; the details in connection with the
transaction must be narrated exactly and in order; the
testimony must be clear, direct, and weighty; and the
witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts at
issue."

18

Id. (quoting Modern Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes,
Inc., 226 Kan. 70, 596 P.2d 816, 824 (1979)).
While the Mostrongs7 testimonies have these characteristics,
Lee Roy Jackson's does not. Lee Roy Jackson's testimony is totally
untrustworthy because he explicitly contradicted himself on several
material facts and did not clearly remember significant details.
Please refer to Appellant's Brief pp. 34-37 for a full discussion
of this issue.

(Please note that there was a typographical error

on p. 36, lines 21-25 of Appellant's Brief.
read:

(4)

These lines should

Last but not least, Lee Roy Jackson testified that he

told the Mostrongs he had a legal easement to the south road, (T.
245) , and then turned around and flatly denied that he had ever
told them that he had an easement to the south road.

(T. 281))

The Jacksons attempt to discredit Larry Mostrong's testimony
by stating that "Larry Mostrong testified that Lee Roy Jackson
stated that the construction of the home was *FHA approvable' and
then

contradicted

represented

himself

construction

(Appellee's Brief p. 36)

by
of

stating
the

house

that
was

Lee
"FHA

Roy

Jackson

approved."

While there is a difference in the word

"approvable" as opposed to "approved," there is little, if any,
difference in the import of the testimony, given the issue of
whether the property was ultimately financeable. This is hardly a
discrepancy which should reflect adversely on Larry Mostrong's
credibility.
As discussed at length in the Mostrongs' previous brief, the
Mostrongs had an affirmative right to rely upon Lee Roy Jackson's
representations about the property.
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The Jacksons' brief argues

that Larry Mostrong read the legal description in the Warranty Deed
at closing and knew, or should have known, that there was no deeded
easement to the property• While it is true that Larry Mostrong did
have access to the legal description, it must be reiterated that
Larry Mostrong was not a sophisticated purchaser, that he did not
have

any

expertise

in

reading

and

understanding

property

descriptions, and, given the language relating to easements in the
Warranty Deed, he would not necessarily have understood that there
was no access easement included in the document.

That Larry

Mostrong had access to this legal description does not negate the
Jacksons' responsibility of knowlege, honesty and candor about
access to the property.

Furthermore, if the Jacksons are holding

Larry Mostrong to the level of technical expertise necessary to
understand the existence (or lack thereof) of an easement from a
legal description, the Jacksons should be required to perform to
the same standard.

Because they had access to the warranty deeds

by which they initially obtained the property and to the Kessler
deqds, they should be found to have unequivocal and definite
knowledge that they did not ever have any legal right of access by
means of the north lane.
In conclusion, the Mostrongs have marshalled the evidence and
shown, despite this evidence, that the trial court's findings to
the effect that Lee Roy Jackson did not make fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentations of material fact to the Mostrongs are
not supported by the preponderance of credible evidence on the
records.

The trial court's findings, accordingly, should be

reversed.
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V.

THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT BECAUSE OP
THE PARTIES' MUTUAL OR UNILATERAL MISTAKES OP PACT.
The trial court relied upon essentially the same evidence to

find that there were no mutual or unilateral mistakes of fact as it
did

to

find

that

there

were

no

fraudulent

or

negligent

misrepresentations, except for evidence relating to the issue of
the Jacksons' knowledge of the falsity of the misrepresentations.
Accordingly, the same arguments set forth in section IV of this
reply brief apply to this issue.
VI.

THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT.
The Jacksons argue that the Mostrongs waited too long after

discovering the problems with the property to rescind the contract.
They rely upon Perry v. Wooda 11, 20 Utah 2d 399, 438 P. 2d 813
(1968) as precedent for this argument. In Perry. Woodall arranged
to purchase a pharmacy from Perry.

Woodall was operating the

business when he discovered, on July 18, 1964, that a substantial
portion of the debt he had purchased was Perry's personal debt.
Rather than immediately rescinding the contract, he continued to
operate the business until September 7, 1964, at which time he was
appointed receiver in an action commenced by one of the creditors
of the business.

He continued to act as a receiver for nearly a

year and one half more, until January, 1966, at which time he
resigned and a successor reciever was appointed. Woodall continued
to operate the business for the successor receiver for nearly
another two years, until March of 1966, at which time he purchased
the assets of the business at the reciever's sale. The court found
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that Woodall's actions were not consistent with an intent to
rescind.
In contrast, the Mostrongs did not discover that there was any
problem with access until December, 1989.

They did not discover

that there were problems with the construction of the house until
June, 1990.

They attempted to rectify the access problem for

several months, but elected to abandon the property and rescind the
contract in July of 1998, within a month of discovering the
construction defects.

They brought suit demanding rescission on

September 17, 1990, only two months after manifesting their intent
to rescind by abandoning the property.

These facts are easily

distinguishable from those in Perry, making Perry a poor precedent
for deciding this case.
The Jacksons argue that the Mostrongs should not be entitled
to rescind because they did not leave the property for seven months
after discovering that there was no legal access to it, while, at
the same time, the Jacksons loudly proclaim that financing was
reasonably available to the Mostrongs if only they would have
worked harder to resolve the problems left to them by the Jacksons.
The Mostrongs acted in good faith in attempting to mitigate the
damages

created

by

the

Jacksons'

failure

to

perform

their

obligation of providing marketable and financeable property.

The

Mostrongs should not be penalized for attempting to work out the
problems with the property in an attempt to fulfill the contract.
Public policy dictates that parties should be entitled to work out
contractual

problems

for

a reasonable

period

of

time

after

discovering a defect, rather than having to immediately rescind at
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the first possible sign of trouble. Such policy encourages parties
to work out their problems between themselves rather than resorting
to litigation.
contrast,

Following the result urged by the Jacksons, in

encourages

parties

to

litigate

at

the

slightest

provocation.
The Jacksons claim that the Mostrongs should not be entitled
to rescind the contract because they have lost rent because of the
Mostrongs' extended occupation of the premises. This is a specious
assertion. Under Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 731
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), rescission damages include the amount paid
for the property less a reasonable rental value of the property for
the time the rescinding party was in possession of it. Thus, the
Jacksons would retain the full rental value of the property for the
entire length of the Mostrongs' occupation of it, unless this court
finds that the Jacksons defrauded the Mostrongs, in which case the
Mostrongs would be entitled to the full amount which they paid for
the property. Lee v. Armstrong, 798 P.2d 84, 88 (Mont. 1990). The
Mostrongs discussed this formula in their major brief.

The

Jacksons, accordingly, have no reason to claim this damage.
The Jacksons further claim that they would be prejudiced by
rescission because of alleged damage to the property committed by
the Mostrongs. The Mostrongs are not aware of any evidence on the
record that they damaged the property.

If there is such evidence,

it is highly contested and the trial court made no finding as to
this issue. The Jacksons7 claim is, therefore, highly improper on
appeal.

Even if such damage should be found to have actually

occurred, however, an adjustment for the damage could be made by
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deducting it from any amount returned to the Mostrongs.

This

argument is improper, unsupported by the record, and does not serve
to defeat the Mostrongs7 claim for rescission.
CONCLUSION
The record indicates that the Mostrongs are entitled to
rescind their contract with the Jacksons and, accordingly, are
entitled to the return of their investment in the contract. There
are several grounds for rescission of this contract, all of which
are supported

by the record,

(1) The Jacksons7

including:

contractual breach in failing to convey

legal access to the

property; (2) the Jacksons contractual breach in failing to convey,
as per the parties7 expectation, property which met underwriters7
standards of financeablity; (3) Lee Roy Jackson7s fraudulent and/or
negligent misrepresentations regarding access to the property
and/or the construction of the house; and (4) the parties7 mutual
and/or unilateral mistakes of fact in selling and purchasing
unmarketable and unfinanceable property. The record also indicates
tha>t the Mostrongs did not sit on their rights, but, after
reasonably attempting to cure the problems, acted promptly in
attempting to rescind the contract; and that rescission is the
equitably proper means of working out a just resolution to this
problem. Accordingly, the Mostrongs respectfully request that this
Court overrule the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
trial court and enter judgment in their favor.
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